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THE MAINSTREAMING OF
LIBERTARIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN*
ILYA SOMIN**
I
INTRODUCTION
Libertarian constitutional thought is a distinctly minority position among
scholars and jurists—one that, at first glance, has little in common with either
modern Supreme Court jurisprudence or the liberalism that dominates the legal
academy. However, libertarian ideas have had greater influence on
constitutional law than first meets the eye.
This article explores the connections between mainstream and libertarian
constitutional thought in recent decades. On a number of important issues,
modern Supreme Court doctrine and liberal constitutional thought have been
significantly influenced by pre–New Deal libertarian (or “classical liberal”)
ideas, even if the influence is often overlooked by observers or unknown to
those influenced. This is particularly true on issues of equal protection and
modern “substantive” due process as it pertains to “noneconomic” rights. Here,
both the Supreme Court and mainstream academics have repudiated early
twentieth-century Progressivism’s advocacy of strict judicial deference to
legislatures. They have also rejected efforts to eliminate common-law and
market-oriented “baselines” for constitutional rights.
The gap between libertarian and mainstream constitutional thought is much
greater on issues of federalism and property rights. Here too, however, recent
decades have seen a degree of convergence. Over the last thirty years it has
become intellectually respectable to support stronger judicial protection for
property rights and federalism. The Supreme Court has become increasingly
willing to protect property rights and to enforce limits on federal power.
Before proceeding, it is worth briefly defining what we mean by
“libertarian” and “mainstream” constitutional thought. By “libertarian,” we
mean the idea that there should be significant constitutional limits on
government in order to protect both “economic” and “noneconomic” rights.
Given that constitutional rights are most often vindicated in modern America
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through judicial review, most libertarian constitutionalists believe that the
courts should enforce these rights. Libertarian jurists and legal scholars also
often advocate strong judicial enforcement of federalism and separation of
powers limits on government power, in part because they provide important
indirect protection for individual freedom.
This relatively broad definition of libertarian constitutional thought is
necessarily oversimplified. It abstracts away from some important internal
disagreements among libertarians. For example, it overlooks the important
distinction between libertarian constitutional theorists who embrace originalism
1
and those who do not. It also does not consider the distinction between
utilitarian libertarians and those who emphasize natural rights. But, for our
purposes, we believe it effectively captures the core of modern libertarian
constitutional thought, as exemplified by leading scholars such as Richard
2
Epstein and Randy Barnett.
Defining the constitutional mainstream is perhaps even more difficult than
defining libertarianism. Here, we use it to indicate the dominant strains in
Supreme Court jurisprudence and academic constitutional thought since World
War II. Obviously, mainstream jurists and legal scholars disagree among
themselves on many issues. But they also share core assumptions, such as the
need for strong judicial review to protect important noneconomic freedoms and
to prevent invidious discrimination by government. Other ideas, such as
advocacy of judicial intervention to enforce federalism and property rights, are
part of mainstream discourse, although they are hotly contested. As we discuss
below, libertarian constitutional thought has significantly influenced both
consensus and disputed mainstream views.
II
THE PRE–NEW DEAL LIBERTARIAN ROOTS OF MODERN
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Even during the heyday of modern liberal American constitutionalism,
classical-liberal thought and doctrine significantly influenced American
constitutional law. Indeed, there are substantial continuities between
constitutional law in the pre–New Deal period and constitutional law as it
developed after World War II.
Pre–New Deal constitutionalism is often referred to as conservative (or even
3
reactionary). In general, however, it was based on classical liberal premises—
1. For an example of nonoriginalist libertarian constitutional theory, see Tom W. Bell, The
Constitution as if Consent Mattered, 16 CHAPMAN L. REV. 269 (2013).
2. For the most comprehensive recent statements of their views, see RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (rev. ed. 2013); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED
GOVERNMENT (2013).
3. See KERMIT. L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 226 (1989) (explaining that this is how the
jurisprudence of the so-called “Lochner era” is often viewed). We do not use the phrase “Lochner
era,” because it is anachronistic, fails to reflect the nuances of the period, and wildly overstates the
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limited government, individual rights, and the rule of law—that still dominate
constitutional law today. Despite successive challenges to constitutional law’s
liberalism from sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, critical legal studies,
and other schools of thought, constitutional law still retains the same basic
liberal contours it had in the 1910s. Some important examples of the liberal
underpinnings of modern constitutional law include: (1) the federal judiciary’s
continued crucial role in maintaining the constitutional order through judicial
review; (2) government inaction is still the baseline by which government
actions that may violate rights are judged; (3) property and liberty are still
considered coherent, judicially protectable concepts; and (4) the state action
doctrine still defines the scope of constitutional rights. Although Americans
today generally accept these elements of modern constitutional law as simply
the natural order of things, they all faced strong intellectual and political
challenges starting in the Progressive era.
The first challenge to the pre–New Deal constitutional order came from the
early twentieth-century Progressives. Many leading Progressives perceived
American “individualism” to be the primary barrier to their success.
Individualism was shorthand for a legal and political system focused on
4
individual rights, especially property and contract rights. Progressives at that
time tended to be “small d” democrats and favored lodging administrative
power and discretion in expert government agencies. Not surprisingly, many
Progressives were very skeptical of—even hostile to—review of constitutional
rights claims by an appointed judiciary with little expertise on the underlying
policy issues.
This skepticism meshed nicely with, and was in part inspired by, the views of
Harvard Law School Professor James B. Thayer. He argued that courts should
only invalidate legislation “when those who have the right to make laws have
not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is
5
not open to rational question.” Thayer influenced entire generations of
6
Progressive lawyers, including Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter. Brandeis
grew so disgusted with what he considered to be “conservative” abuse of
judicial review that he wanted to repeal the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving no clear avenue for the
7
protection of constitutional rights against the states. His protégé, Frankfurter,
along with Learned Hand, would have been satisfied with abolishing only the

importance of Lochner v. New York at the time. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING
LOCHNER (2011).
4. See, e.g., GEORGE W. ALGER, THE OLD LAW AND THE NEW ORDER 241 (1913); Richard T.
Ely, Economic Theory and Labor Legislation, 9 AM. ECON. ASS’N. Q. 124, 146 (1908).
5. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
6. See Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes,
Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71, 73 (1978); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Learned Hand: The
Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 873, 874, 885 (1995).
7. Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 318, 325.
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8

Due Process Clause. Oliver Wendell Holmes, the great hero of Progressive
legal intellectuals in the 1910s and 1920s (though not a Progressive himself), at
times seemed to want to virtually abolish the judicial role in protecting
9
10
constitutional rights. Beyond Progressive jurists, various Progressive writers,
11
intellectuals, and politicians, including Theodore Roosevelt, Senator William
12
13
Borah, and Senator Robert LaFollete, sought in the 1910s and early 1920s to
severely limit judicial independence and the power of judicial review.
Robert Hale and other early legal realists continued the Progressives’
assault on constitutional protections for individual rights by attacking the very
14
notion of rights against government coercion in the early 1920s. According to
this line of thinking, a fixed amount of coercion exists. If courts were to restrain
the government from taking an action—say, segregating residential
neighborhoods by law—the courts would be stopping the government from
forcing those who prefer integration to segregate. At the same time, the courts
would be “coercing” those who prefer segregation by preventing them from
15
enforcing that preference through legislation.
8. See Frankfurter, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, unsigned editorial, 40 NEW REPUBLIC
110, 113 (1924); Hand, An Unseen Reversal, unsigned editorial, NEW REPUBLIC 7, 7–8 ( 1915).
9. E.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (stating the states’ police power
may be used “in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.”); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I think that the word liberty in the
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law.”); KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151 (2004) (quoting Holmes as arguing that “a
law should be called good if it reflects the will of the dominant forces of the community, even if it takes
us all to hell.”). For a humorous take, see H.L. Mencken, Mr. Justice Holmes, AM. MERCURY, May
1930, at 123 (suggesting that if Holmes’s judicial opinions “were accepted literally, there would be
scarcely any brake at all upon lawmaking, and the Bill of Rights would have no more significance than
the Code of Manu”).
10. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. RANSOM, MAJORITY RULE AND THE JUDICIARY ch. VIII (1912)
(supporting Theodore Roosevelt’s proposal that judicial decisions by subject to “popular recall”);
GILBERT E. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY 212–24 (1912) (calling for popular recall of judges to
encourage them to act more reasonably).
11. In his 1912 campaign for president, Roosevelt advocated allowing state voters to “recall” state
supreme court judicial decisions that they opposed. Theodore Roosevelt, A Charter of Democracy:
Address Before the Ohio Constitutional Convention, THE OUTLOOK, Feb. 24, 1912, at 390. Obviously,
this would have been a precedent for similar federal action.
12. Borah argued that it should take a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court to invalidate legislation.
64 Cong. Rec. 3959 (1923).
13. LaFollette, while running a vigorous Progressive Party campaign in 1924, promised direct
election of federal judges and enabling Congress to overturn Supreme Court decisions. KENNETH
CAMPBELL MACKAY, PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 11, 144 (1947); WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY:
POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 193–217 (1994).
See also 62 Cong. Rec. 9076 (1922) (reprinting LaFollette speech calling for a ban on lower federal
court’s invalidating laws, and for Congress to have the authority to overturn Supreme Court decisions).
14. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in the Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI.
Q. 470 (1923). See also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 107–11.
15. Se HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 78 (1927) (criticizing the Supreme
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Once Progressive and modern liberal Justices took control of the Supreme
Court, the Court had the opportunity to enforce judicial restraint. The Court,
however, rejected both the Progressives’ devotion to strict judicial restraint and
the realists’ suggestion that rights are illusory. Moreover, despite several
16
dalliances with the contrary perspective, the Court ultimately continued to
require that Fourteenth Amendment claims be based only on government, and
not private action. And despite one significant step in the direction of
17
recognizing positive rights via the “new property,” the idea that the
18
Constitution is a “charter of negative liberties” has survived.
Instead of adopting the Progressive and legal realist critique of rights-based
liberalism, the Supreme Court gradually invented modern constitutional
liberalism. Although the Court’s constitutional priorities shifted away from
defending federalism, property rights, and contractual rights in favor of the sort
of jurisprudence defended in and advocated by John Hart Ely’s Democracy and
Distrust, the basic contours of liberal constitutionalism remained. Thus the
Court, instead of abandoning jurisprudential liberalism, reshaped it to suit the
sort of liberalism that dominated New Deal and post–New Deal thinking.
Eventually, the dominance of post–New Deal constitutional liberalism
during the Warren Court era provoked two significant counter-reactions. From
the right, conservatives, distressed by what they saw as the Court’s “activist”
invention of new rights, adopted the old Progressive mantra of judicial restraint.
Robert Bork, for example, adopted the “neutral principles” argument
(in)famously made by the Progressive scholar Herbert Wechsler in the context
19
20
of school desegregation and applied it to First Amendment jurisprudence. He
concluded that the Warren Court had engaged in significant overreach in its
21
First Amendment jurisprudence.
From the left, critical legal studies theorists, commonly known as “crits,”
questioned the coherence and justness of a constitutional system built on liberal
pillars. Mark Tushnet, one of the crits’ brightest constitutional stars, argued that
rights-based jurisprudence is unstable, indeterminate, and, ultimately,

Court for invalidating residential segregation ordinances, and thus violating whites’ right to live in
segregated neighborhoods). These ideas continued to have force in circles though at least the late
1950s. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959) (claiming that he could not distinguish, on a principled basis, between the right of blacks to
attend an integrated public schools and the right of whites to attend segregated schools). Wechsler went
to law school in Columbia in the 1920s, when it was a center of Progressive legal thought.
16. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) for the most significant example.
17. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a denial of government welfare
benefits could be a violation of the Due Process Clause because such benefits should be deemed
“property” protected by the Clause).
18. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
19. See generally Wechsler, supra note 15.
20. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22
(1971).
21. Id.
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22

reactionary.
He summed up the antagonistic relationship between
constitutional liberalism and critical legal studies succinctly: “Critical legal
23
studies . . . is not committed at any level to liberalism.”
Critical legal studies has also influenced some leading legal scholars
associated with mainstream liberalism, such as Cass Sunstein. Sunstein famously
argued that the Supreme Court should cease repeating what he deemed to be
Lochner’s mistake: using common-law baselines to determine the existence and
24
scope of constitutional rights. By common-law baselines, Sunstein did not
mean the actual common law, but rather a stylized common law that treats
private-market decisionmaking as the appropriate baseline for legal
25
decisionmaking. Critical legal studies was also important in the development
of critical race theory, whose advocates became leading voices favoring such
26
illiberal constitutional ideas as limiting the First Amendment so that the
27
government may prohibit hate speech. Critical race theory advocates also
favored interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection of the law as solely a guarantee of group “antisubordination” and
28
not as a guarantee of an individual right to fair treatment by government.
Despite all of this intellectual tumult, constitutional liberalism has survived
and thrived. Conservatives these days are less inclined to channel old
Progressive views about judicial restraint, and they are more inclined to speak
of the necessity of courts enforcing the original meaning of the Constitution.
29
Critical legal studies mostly disintegrated in the early 1990s, and a form of
originalism has even taken hold in some intellectual precincts that might once
30
have been attracted to critical legal studies. Attempts to get the Supreme
Court to abolish the state action doctrine, to go beyond token recognition of the
“New Property,” to allow restrictions on hate speech, or even to reduce the

22. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363–64 (1984). See also Duncan
Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
23. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36
STAN. L. REV. 623, 627 (1984).
24. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
25. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003).
26. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 1 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds.,
1st ed.1995) (noting critical race theory’s “discontent with liberalism”).
27. E.g., MARI J. MATSUDA, ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
28. See, e.g., CHARLES LAWRENCE & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING THE
CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Rivers of the River: A Critique
of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 951 (2001) (arguing that the
Equal Protection Clause mandates “ridding society of racial subordination” and not “mandating equal
treatment as an individual right”); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development, and Future Directions of
Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336 (2006) (stating “Critical
Race Theory’s , , , stance is one of ‘antisubordination”’).
29. See Peter Goodrich, Sleeping With the Enemy: An Essay on the Politics of Critical Legal Studies
in America, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 389, 390 (1993).
30. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
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level of review for government affirmative action preferences to something less
than strict scrutiny all have failed.
Moreover, it is not just the general contours of modern constitutional
jurisprudence, but some of the Supreme Court’s specific doctrines that are
direct descendants of the classical-liberal jurisprudence of the early twentieth
century. Modern constitutional jurisprudence, shaped to a large extent by the
liberal Warren and Burger Courts, is, to a great extent, a synthesis of early
twentieth-century Progressivism and conservative classical liberalism of the
same period. Modern doctrine reflects Progressive fondness for government
economic regulation and expansion of federal responsibilities to set national
standards. But it also retains classical-liberal support for individual rights and
skepticism towards the arbitrary use of government power, reflected in the pre–
New Deal equal protection and due process cases involving both economic and
31
noneconomic rights claims.
III
EQUAL PROTECTION
32

Despite signs of doctrinal instability, black-letter law still holds that, under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, three tiers of scrutiny
exist. Laws challenged as discrimination based on race or alienage receive strict
scrutiny, laws challenged as discrimination based on sex or legitimacy receive
intermediate scrutiny, and all other claims of discrimination result in rational
basis scrutiny.
Generations of law students have undoubtedly wondered where these tiers
of scrutiny come from given that they are nowhere to be found in the text of the
Constitution. And one might wonder whether they have any relationship to
pre–New Deal equal protection jurisprudence, which, at least formally, treated
all equal protection claims with the same level of scrutiny. In fact, there is a
great deal of continuity between pre–New Deal doctrine and modern equal
protection doctrine, and the existence of the tiers of scrutiny becomes more
understandable once one studies the history of the Supreme Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence.
Opposition to “class legislation,” that is, legislation that classifies on an
33
34
arbitrary basis, had deep roots in pre–Civil War American thought and, after
the Civil War, quickly became an interpretive focal point of the Fourteenth
31. See David E. Bernstein, The Conservative Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 19 GEO. MASON. L. REV.
861, 864 (2012); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2003) [hereinafter Bernstein, Lochner
Era Revisionism, Revised].
32. See infra notes 62–65.
33. Arbitrary legislation, as one contemporary scholar pointed out, meant “oppressive or unjust or
not based upon a sufficient reason.” Robert P. Reeder, Is Unreasonable Legislation Unconstitutional?,
62 U. PA. L. REV. 191, 192 (1913).
34. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
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35

Amendment. For example, in his influential concurring opinion in Butchers’
36
Union v. Crescent City, Justice Stephen Field stated that the Fourteenth
Amendment was “designed to prevent all discriminating legislation for the
benefit of some to the disparagement of others” and that the Amendment
“inhibit[ed] discriminating and partial enactments, favoring some to the
37
impairment of the rights of others.” The Supreme Court’s opinions were
initially unclear on whether the ban on class legislation found its textual support
in the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, or both. The language
of the Equal Protection Clause, however, seems better suited for class
legislation analysis, and the Court eventually used that clause as the primary
38
textual basis for class legislation cases.
The obvious problem with a ban on class legislation is that no law affects
everyone exactly the same way, and differentiating between arbitrary and nonarbitrary classifications is difficult. Nor are courts, as nonparticipants in the
legislative process, in a particularly good position to draw the relevant
distinctions. As a result, in 1884, the Court strictly qualified the ban on class
legislation, explaining that the unconstitutionality of class legislation did not
39
preclude all special or partial legislation. The Court added that “[s]pecial
burdens are often necessary for general benefits,—for supplying water,
preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many
40
other objects.” Although “[r]egulations for these purposes may press with
more or less weight upon one than upon another,” they are constitutional
because they are “designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions
upon any one, but to promote, with as little inconvenience as possible, the
41
general good.”
In 1888, the Supreme Court again emphasized the narrow reach of the
42
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on class legislation. The Court
unanimously rejected the argument “that legislation which is special in its
43
character is necessarily within the constitutional inhibition.” Justice Field
explained, “nothing can be further from the fact. The greater part of all
legislation is special, either in the object sought to be attained by it, or in the
35. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 459 (3d ed. 1874)
(“[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules.”); id. at 466 (“[T]he same
securities which one citizen may demand, all others are entitled to.”).
36. Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 758 (1884) (Field, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 759.
38. See RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW; A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE
ON THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOLLOWED BY THE COURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
CONCEPT OF THE “LAW OF THE LAND” 277–78 (1926); Victoria F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The
Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955 (2009).
39. See MOTT, supra note 38, at 31–32.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See generally Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888).
43. Id. at 209.
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44

extent of its application.” Special legislation is not illicit class legislation “if all
persons brought under its influence are treated alike under the same
45
conditions.”
Although the Court occasionally overturned as illicit class legislation
legislative classifications that seemed patently discriminatory and that lacked
46
any valid justification, such decisions were relatively rare. Meanwhile, the
Court upheld several laws that seemed very plausible candidates for
47
condemnation as class legislation, including laws requiring racial segregation.
Racial classifications were treated with no more skepticism than were other
classifications, and given the racism of the time, the Court was not prepared to
48
condemn racial classifications as inherently arbitrary.
49
In Plessy v. Ferguson, for example, the Court infamously argued that the
segregation law at issue was not arbitrary discriminatory class legislation
because it followed the “established usages, customs, and traditions of the
50
people,” and was passed “with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and
51
the preservation of the public peace and good order.” Given “racial instincts,”
segregating whites and African Americans was a reasonable legislative
classification, and not class legislation, because a “statute which implies merely
a legal distinction . . . has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902) (invalidating an antitrust law
that exempted only farmers and ranchers); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 114–15
(1901) (Harlan, J., concurring for six Justices) (invalidating a state statute that regulated rates for some
stockyard companies but not for others); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897)
(invalidating a law that allowed plaintiffs with small claims against railroads to recover attorneys’ fees if
the railroad initially refused to pay the claim and then lost at trial).
47. See, e.g., Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92, 95 (1900) (upholding an exemption
for planters and farmers from a tax on the refining of sugar as a reasonable classification and finding
that the law was “obviously intended as an encouragement to agriculture” but was not “pure
favoritism”); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 104 (1899).
48. CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 80
(1987) (“[T]he approach that the Court took to state economic and social regulations paralleled and
anticipated its treatment of restrictions on blacks”). See Richard S. Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in
the Supreme Court: 1873–1903, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 667, 696 (1980) (concluding that during this period,
“the objection to discrimination on grounds of race may be merely a special case of the objection to
classifications not reasonably related to a police power objective”). The Court, however, did hold that
the discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral legislation can constitute illicit arbitrary
discrimination on the basis of race and alienage. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion
cannot be resisted that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to
which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified. The
discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public administration which enforces it is a denial
of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.
Id. Unlike the modern Supreme Court, however, at the time, Supreme Court doctrine held that the
Court would not inquire into legislative motive. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
49. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
50. Id. at 550.
51. Id.
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52

races.” The pre–New Deal Supreme Court also routinely upheld sex
53
classifications against equal protection challenges.
The Court, meanwhile, rejected more aggressive state-court decisions, such
54
55
as those holding that “truck acts” and laws restricting women’s hours of labor
were illicit class legislation. By the time the so-called Lochner era was nearing
its end in the 1930s, the Court limited its rulings holding legislation to be
unconstitutional “class legislation” primarily to cases involving seemingly
56
arbitrary differential tax burdens.
When liberals formed a new majority on the Supreme Court beginning in
the late 1930s, they stopped using the Equal Protection Clause to protect
57
economic interests when there was no evidence of invidious discrimination
against a minority group. Contrary to Justice Brandeis’s wishes, however, the
Equal Protection Clause hardly faded into oblivion. The first hint of resilience
58
came in United States v. Carolene Products. There, the Supreme Court,
signaling its eventual withdrawal from serious review of ordinary economic
regulation, held that such regulations pass constitutional muster if they pass a
59
“rational basis” test. But in the famous footnote four, the Court also suggested
that a “more searching judicial inquiry” might be needed when legislation is
60
motivated by “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”
Eventually, concern for the rights of minorities led to the three-tier test we
are familiar with today. This test is broadly consistent with the concern for class
legislation that motivated pre–New Deal equal protection jurisprudence. It can
52. Id. at 543.
53. The key precedent was Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The one exception was Adkins
v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), in which the Court invalidated a D.C. minimum wage law for
women because it violated a woman’s right to liberty of contract. The Court distinguished earlier cases
involving maximum hours, night work, and other restrictions on women’s labor on the grounds that,
although there are real physical differences between men and women, the latter are no less capable of
bargaining for fair wages than are the former.
54. Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 (1901). For prior state court decisions
invalidating truck acts, see State v. Loomis, 22 S.W. 350, 353 (Mo. 1893); State v. Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285,
288 (W. Va. 1889). See also Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886).
55. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908). State cases holding such laws unconstitutional
included People v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 131, 136–37 (1907); Burcher v. People, 41 Colo. 495, 503–04
(1907); Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 456 (1895).
56. See, e.g., Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937); Valentine v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936); Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935) (invalidating a graduated
sales tax that applied a higher rate to larger merchants); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933)
(overturning a graduated retail sales tax that rose with the number of stores a chain store company
owned); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389
(1928) (holding that a statute taxing corporations that owned cabs, but not individual owners, violated
the Equal Protection Clause); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
57. E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963). Ferguson was unanimous. By contract, in
1947 some of the Justices were still willing to countenance Equal Protection challenges to economic
regulation. See Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (rejecting an equal
protection claim to a nepotistic licensing law by a 5-4 vote).
58. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
59. Id. at 152.
60. Id. at 152 n.4.
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be explained in these terms: the Equal Protection Clause bans arbitrary
classifications. The judiciary has neither the mandate nor the expertise to
determine whether each piece of legislation that might be challenged involves
an arbitrary or non-arbitrary classification. Instead, the courts use heuristics.
They utilize a strong presumption that classifications, in general, are legitimate.
A classification by race or alienage, however, raises the suspicion that the
classification is arbitrary. Being a resident alien or a member of a racial class
seems like an inherently arbitrary reason for classification, and such
classifications are especially likely to result from prejudice rather than a
reasoned attempt to serve the public good. Therefore, such classifications are
presumptively invalid and can survive only if they pass “strict scrutiny” review.
Similarly, given the long history of unjust and arbitrary discrimination against
women, the courts have reason to suspect the legitimacy of classifications by
sex. But because men and women, unlike whites and blacks, are intrinsically
different in some important ways, a midlevel standard of review, instead of
strict scrutiny, has been deemed appropriate for sex classifications.
Thus, rather than seeing modern equal protection jurisprudence as a novel
departure from pre–New Deal classical liberalism, it is better conceived as a
modern liberal reinterpretation of the jurisprudence that the Supreme Court
adopted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. If anything, this
61
understanding is reinforced by such recent decisions as Romer v. Evans and
62
United States v. Windsor, where the Supreme Court, taking Justice Kennedy’s
lead, has in practice ignored the tiered-scrutiny approach that would have
63
required extremely deferential rational basis review. Instead, the Court has
64
applied a standard akin to the Old Court’s class-legislation methodology: If the
government is classifying people for arbitrary reasons not clearly related to any
legitimate government interest, then the law violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
65
Moreover, as minority groups have gone from being “discrete and insular”
to wielding substantial political power, the Court has resisted attempts to
weaken its standard of review for racial classifications that favor certain
66
minority groups. Liberal arguments can be made for racial and ethnic
preferences in limited circumstances. Nevertheless, a race-neutral strict scrutiny
standard of review for racial classifications seems broadly consistent with the
classical-liberal principles of prohibiting government from drawing arbitrary

61. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
62. See generally 133 S. Ct. 1512 (2013).
63. See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
945, 948 (2004) (discussing how the Court has deviated from its official tiers of scrutiny).
64. See Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States v.
Windsor, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV.117, 139–40; Jack Balkin, Windsor and the Constitutional
Prohibition on Class Legislation, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2013/06/windsor-and-constitutional-prohibition.html.
65. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
66. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013).
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distinctions between its citizens and avoiding dangerous concentrations of
67
power in the hands of government.
IV
MODERN “SUBSTANTIVE” DUE PROCESS

68

The Supreme Court’s modern “substantive” due process decisions also have
direct antecedents in pre–New Deal classical-liberal jurisprudence. Although
some have argued that the pre–New Deal due process decisions were grounded
69
in class legislation concerns, after Lochner, these decisions primarily involved
the Court trying to protect the fundamental rights of the American people from
70
oppressive government regulations. The terminology has changed over the
decades—it is very unusual for modern judges to speak of natural rights, and
“state interests” have replaced “police powers” as justifications for challenged
legislation—but the basic idea is the same.
In the early post-Reconstruction period, the Supreme Court held that, to the
extent the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provided any
substantive protection against government overreach, it primarily, or perhaps
71
exclusively, protected individuals from class legislation. The Supreme Court
interpreted the due process prohibition on class legislation quite narrowly,
allowing, for example, obvious special interest legislation banning the
72
production of margarine at the behest of dairy farmers. A series of challenges
to labor regulation based on class legislation arguments failed in the late 1890s
73
and early 1900s.
The Court soon replaced class legislation analysis in due process cases with a
focus on the liberty interest presented by the party challenging allegedly
74
arbitrary legislation. Indeed, by 1905, the Supreme Court explicitly questioned

67. See David E. Bernstein, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and the Failed
Attempt to Square a Circle, 8 NYU J. L. & LIB. 210 (2014).
68. As applied to the pre–New Deal Court, the phrase “substantive due process” is anachronistic,
as courts did not explicitly distinguish between the substantive and procedural aspects of due process.
See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 103–04 (2d ed. 1998); James W. Ely, Jr., Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley,
Property Rights, and Race, 51 VAND. L. REV. 953, 956 (1998); Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism
Revisited, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 221, 244 (1999). See also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE NEW DEAL 245 (2000) (explaining that it was not until the 1950s that jurisprudence under the
Due Process Clause was separated into by courts and legal scholars into “substantive” and
“procedural” categories).
69. See, e.g., Gillman, supra note 34 (arguing this position at length).
70. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, supra note 31, at 15.
71. In Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889), the Supreme Court even declared that the
absence of arbitrary classification defeatsnot just successful equal protection claims against regulatory
legislation, but due process claims as well.
72. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 679 (1888).
73. See generally Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903); St. Louis Cons. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185
U.S. 203, 207 (1902); Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 (1901); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366 (1898).
74. See BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 3, at ch. 1.
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whether the guarantee of due process of the law applied to class legislation at
75
all. The Court eventually concluded that it did, but that the Due Process
Clause only provided a “mere minimum” of protection against unequal
76
legislation.
77
A key doctrinal turning point was the 1898 case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana. In
Allgeyer, the Supreme Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of liberty from arbitrary deprivation included
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use
them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into
all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a
78
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
79

In Lochner v. New York, however, the majority almost entirely ignored the
class legislation issue even though both the lower court rulings and Lochner’s
brief had focused on it. Instead, the Court focused on the right to liberty of
80
contract protected by the Due Process Clause.
Allgeyer and Lochner established the Due Process Clause as a fertile source
81
for the protection of liberty rights against the states. However, the scope of
these rights seemed limited. For almost two decades, the Supreme Court, as in
Allgeyer and Lochner, only enforced protections for liberty of contract and
82
property rights. These rights, moreover, could be overcome by the government
upon showing that the challenged laws fell within its “police powers,” which
were in turn somewhat amorphous and subject to idiosyncratic and, at times,
inconsistent judicial definition.
Eventually, however, the Court expanded the scope of due process
83
protections. In Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923, the Court invalidated a Nebraska
statute banning the teaching of foreign languages to children. The Court stated
that the Due Process Clause protects not just economic rights, but the rights “to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
84
pursuit of happiness by free men.” The Court proceeded to use the Clause to
invalidate laws banning private schools and restricting the teaching of the
85
Japanese language. The Court also held that the Clause protects freedom of
75. E.g., District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 142 (1909).
76. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331–32 (1921).
77. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
78. Id. at 589.
79. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
80. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, supra note 31, at 25–26.
81. Id. at 28.
82. More precisely, Allgeyer only enforced the right “to contract outside of the state.” Allgeyer,
165 U.S. at 587. Lochner enforced a broader right to liberty of contract. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 51.
83. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
84. Id. at 399.
85. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).
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expression, and began to invalidate state laws restricting freedom of speech.
These cases are often incorrectly described as “incorporation” cases; in fact,
they do not mention the First Amendment, but instead rely solely on the Due
Process Clause.
Meanwhile, the Court held in several cases that even valid police-power
86
rationales could not save legislation that violated fundamental rights. In
87
Buchanan v. Warley, the Court invalidated a Louisville, Kentucky residential
segregation law as a violation of the Due Process Clause. The Court
acknowledged that Kentucky had asserted at least two valid police-power
rationales for the law, including limiting interracial violence. The Court held
that the law was nevertheless “not a legitimate exercise of the police power of
the State, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with
88
property rights except by due process of law.”
Six years later, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court acknowledged that
Nebraska had a legitimate interest in ensuring that the children of the state
89
become fluent in English. The law banning the teaching of foreign languages
was still held unconstitutional, however, “because a desirable end cannot be
90
promoted by prohibited means.” Similarly, in Farrington v. Tokushige, the
Court acknowledged the government’s legitimate interest in encouraging
Japanese assimilation in Hawaii, but still held that a law banning Japanese91
language instruction violated due process rights.
Given longstanding Progressive hostility to the use of the Due Process
Clause to protect substantive rights, one could reasonably have expected the
Court to overrule all of these precedents as soon as a majority could be cobbled
together to overturn Lochner and its progeny. Instead, in Palko v. Connecticut,
the Court’s new Progressive-liberal majority suggested that some of the rights in
92
the Bill of Rights might be worthy of due process protection, and in Carolene
Products’ footnote four the Court suggested that government infringement on
93
certain “fundamental rights” might require extra judicial scrutiny.
For the next twenty-five years or so, the Court rejected opportunities to
protect substantive rights directly via the Due Process Clause. In particular, in
94
Skinner v. Oklahoma, it relied on an equal protection argument instead of a
liberty argument to invalidate a law requiring sterilization of certain prisoners.

86. For additional discussion, see David E. Bernstein, The Conservative Origins of Strict Scrutiny,
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 861 (2012).
87. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
88. Id. at 82.
89. 262 U.S. at 396.
90. Id. at 401.
91. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).
92. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
93. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
94. See generally 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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95

In Bolling v. Sharpe, objections from Justice Hugo Black forced Chief Justice
Earl Warren to edit a ruling holding public-school segregation in D.C. to violate
96
“substantive” due process standards into a somewhat incoherent mush.
During the same post–World War II period, the Court gradually adopted
the incorporation doctrine, holding that some of the rights protected by the Bill
of Rights were “incorporated” in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Though the Court denied it, the incorporation cases were themselves a
species of “substantive” due process because they protected substantive rights
via the Due Process Clause. And although the origins of the incorporation
doctrine are sometimes incorrectly attributed to Progressive Justice Louis
97
Brandeis, the first advocate of incorporation was actually Justice John
98
Marshall Harlan. Harlan’s overall jurisprudential philosophy is a bit obscure.
He was, however, at least a classical-liberal fellow traveler, as he supported the
99
100
right to liberty of contract and believed in natural rights.
Some old-school Progressives, notably an elderly Learned Hand, objected to
the Warren Court’s nascent use of the Due Process Clause to protect rights.
Hand criticized the Court’s incorporation doctrine in general, and the
incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause in particular. He contended that there is “no constitutional
basis” for the Court to exercise any more supervision over state and local
101
regulation of freedom of expression than it did over liberty of contract.
95. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
96. See generally David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia,
93 GEO. L.J. 1253 (2004).
97. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 641 (2009).
98. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114–27 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 540–41 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to
Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1459 (2000).
99. See generally Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (Harlan, J.) (invalidating a law in part
because it violated the right to liberty of contract).
100. Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 252 (1905) (stating that
there are limitations on all organs of government which “grow[] out of the essential nature of all free
governments”). See also Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 195 (1910); Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 68 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[T]he right to enjoy one’s religious belief, unmolested by any human power, is no more sacred
nor more fully or distinctly recognized than is the right to impart and receive instruction not
harmful to the public. The denial of either right would be an infringement of the liberty
inherent in the freedom secured by the fundamental law.
Id.
See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (Harlan, J.) (“There is, of course, a sphere
within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the
authority of any human government—especially of any free government existing under a written
constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that will.”); Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
238 (1897) (Harlan, J.) (stating that compensation for the taking of property for public use is a “settled
principle of universal law, reaching back of all constitutional provisions”). See generally MILTON R.
KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 38–40 (2001) (noting
Harlan’s influence on the development of natural rights jurisprudence on the Supreme Court in the
years leading up to Lochner).
101. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50–51, 56 (1958).
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Hand and other critics, however, failed to slow the embrace of a broad
reading of the Due Process Clause. A speed bump arose in the form of a 1963
102
opinion upholding a ban on debt adjustment by nonlawyers. Justice Black,
who believed that the “substantive” aspect of the Due Process Clause should be
wholly limited to incorporating the Bill of Rights, wrote for the Court that “a
state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some
103
express prohibition in the Constitution.”
104
Just two years later, though, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme
Court (over a strong dissent from Justice Black) enforced an unenumerated
right via the Due Process Clause for the first time since 1936. Four different
Justices in the majority wrote opinions in Griswold, and all of them cited the
105
pre–New Deal opinions of Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters
in support of finding a fundamental right to privacy under the Due Process
Clause. The main opinion for the Court, written by Justice William O. Douglas,
denied that the Court was utilizing “substantive” due process. Rather, Douglas
argued, the opinion was akin to incorporation, because it relied on the
“penumbras, formed by emanations” from rights protected by the Bill of
106
Rights. Fifty years later, it seems fair to say that Douglas fooled no one but
(perhaps) himself.
Over the ensuing decades, the Court recognized other fundamental rights,
107
108
including the right to terminate a pregnancy and the right to marry. At first,
the Court enforced a strict dichotomy: A right was either “fundamental,” and
infringements on it were subject to strict scrutiny, or a right was
nonfundamental, and protected only by the rational basis test. The Court has
eroded this dichotomy, however, by adopting a unique “undue burden” test for
109
abortion regulations, by refusing to articulate the standard of review that
applies to laws infringing on the fundamental right to control the upbringing of
110
one’s children, and by protecting the right to engage in homosexual sex
111
without recognizing it as a fundamental right. Modern substantive due process
jurisprudence, then, has not only always had its antecedents in pre–New Deal
classical-liberal jurisprudence, but has, over time, become more similar to how
that jurisprudence operates in practice—judges weigh the importance of the
right against the government’s purported interest in infringement. Two big
chasms between substantive due process jurisprudence in 1913 and 2013
nevertheless remain. First, the Court no longer recognizes pure “moral”
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
Id. at 729.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85.
See generally Roe v. Wade, 401 U.S. 113 (1973).
See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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concerns as valid rationales for infringement on rights. Second, the Court
refuses to give economic rights any significant protection. But the point is not
that modern substantive due process jurisprudence is the same as the pre–New
Deal Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence. Rather, the point is that
the modern doctrine is a direct descendant of, and is significantly influenced by,
the old doctrine.
V
FEDERALISM
At first glance, the libertarian approach to issues of constitutional
federalism has little in common with either modern liberal constitutional theory
or with the position taken by the modern Supreme Court. Most modern liberal
constitutional theorists generally advocate nearly unconstrained federal power,
especially when it comes to making regulations that might affect the national
112
economy in any significant way. Others go even farther, and argue that
113
federalism questions should be left entirely to the political process, or at least
subject to very heavy judicial deference.
Over the last twenty years, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have enforced
some modest limits on the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce
114
Clause and have interpreted the Tenth Amendment to constrain Congress’s
115
power to commandeer the states. Most recently, in the Affordable Care Act
case, a majority of Justices ruled that there are important constraints on
Congress’s power to impose mandates under both the Commerce Clause and
116
the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Court has also enforced limits on the
scope of congressional enforcement power under Section Five of the
117
Fourteenth Amendment and Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment. But
all of these decisions were closely contested 5-4 or 6-3 rulings, and most liberal
scholars and jurists reject them. Moreover, they do not go nearly as far in
constraining federal power as libertarian constitutional theorists would like.
Although the Court has not gone as far as libertarians have wanted it to, in
recent years it has embraced several key ideas that have been championed by
libertarian critics of the post–New Deal consensus on federalism. Similarly,
112. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 30, at ch. 9; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT:
FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008).
113. For leading statements of this view, see generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1980); Herbert J. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
114. See, e.g., Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
115. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
166 (1992).
116. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,132 S. Ct. 2566, 2572 (2012).
117. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (enforcing limits on congressional
power under Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516
(1997) (enforcing limits on congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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there are important commonalities between the libertarian approach to
federalism questions and the mainstream liberal approach to other issues of
structural constitutional law—most notably, separation of powers.
A. Libertarianism and the Revival of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism
In the 1930s and 1940s, the New Deal Supreme Court issued a series of
decisions severely reducing judicial enforcement of constitutional limits on the
scope of congressional power, particularly the Commerce Clause and the
Spending Clause. The Court ruled that Congress has the power to regulate
118
almost any activity that affects interstate commerce, and also held that there
are few judicially enforceable limits on its power to allocate federal funds under
119
the General Welfare Clause. In the aftermath of the New Deal transformation
of constitutional law, the conventional wisdom among most jurists and legal
scholars was that the courts should defer to the political branches of
government when it comes to federalism questions. That conventional wisdom
was reinforced by the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, when the banner of
“states’ rights” was used to defend Jim Crow segregation, and expansive federal
power was needed to break the southern states’ resistance to the establishment
of equal rights for African Americans.
From the New Deal period until well into the 1980s, libertarian
constitutional theorists who argued that the judiciary should enforce tight limits
120
on federal power, such as Richard Epstein, were severely out of step with the
legal mainstream. Over the last twenty-five years, however, the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts have revived the idea of judicial enforcement of limits on
121
federal power and have helped make it intellectually respectable again.
During the same period, libertarian legal scholars such as Randy Barnett, Gary
Lawson, and Michael Greve have deepened and expanded the libertarian
122
critique of the dominant post–New Deal approach to federalism.
The Court has not gone nearly as far as libertarian constitutional theorists
would like in limiting federal power. Scholars such as Epstein and Barnett
would prefer to reverse many of the core New Deal decisions and restore much
123
of the pre-1930s’ understanding of the scope of federal power. But the Court
118. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
119. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 606 (1937).
120. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 5, 6 (1988);
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (1987).
121. For an overview of that revival and its causes, see Ilya Somin, The Impact of Judicial Review
on American Federalism: Promoting Centralization More than State Autonomy, in COURTS IN
FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR UNITARISTS? (Nicholas Aroney & John Kincaid, eds.)
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2311400.
122. See, generally BARNETT, supra note 2; MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN
CONSTITUTION (2012); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101 (2001); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 290 (1993).
123. See generally BARNETT, supra note 2; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL
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has endorsed several of the most important precepts long advocated by
libertarian scholars.
At the most basic level, the Court has emphasized that there are meaningful
limits to federal power, and the courts have a duty to enforce them. Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s 1995 opinion in Lopez v. United States—the first to strike
down a statute as beyond the bounds of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority
in nearly sixty years—begins with the “first principle [that] [t]he Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers,” and that it is the task of
124
the judiciary to enforce those limitations. This is a direct repudiation of New
Deal–inspired notions that structural limits on the scope of congressional power
are left up to the discretion of the political process. Later decisions such as
Morrison v. United States and NFIB v. Sebelius have reinforced that conclusion.
The Court’s enforcement limits on federal power remain very limited. For
example, the Court continues to apply the highly deferential rational basis test
on the question of whether an “economic activity” that Congress seeks to
regulate has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce such that it can use
125
the commerce power.
On the other hand, the Court has not been similarly deferential in
addressing the question of whether a given object of regulation is an economic
activity in the first place. Most notably, in NFIB v. Sebelius, five Justices
concluded that failure to purchase health insurance is actually “inactivity”
outside the scope of the Commerce Clause and thus not subject to
126
congressional mandates, despite its significant impact on commerce. If the
Court need not defer to Congress in determining whether a regulated activity
(or inactivity) qualifies as economic, this is a potentially significant limitation on
the scope of congressional power. So far, it has not been so, in part because the
Court has defined economic activity broadly, as anything involving “the
127
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.” Nonetheless, the
lack of judicial deference on this issue gives the Court the option of retreating
from that definition in the future.
An additional theme of libertarian constitutionalism that has been
embraced by the Supreme Court is the idea that the limitation of federal power
128
is important to the preservation of individual liberty. In Bond v. United States,
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote an opinion for a unanimous Court which held
that “[s]tates are not the sole intended beneficiaries of federalism,” because
CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUESTION FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014).
124. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
125. Id. at 561. See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (“[w]e need not determine whether
[defendants’] activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding”).
126. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,132 S.Ct. 2566, 2580–94 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.).
127. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25–26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720
(1966)).
128. For libertarian assertions of this idea, see generally BARNETT, supra note 2; EPSTEIN, supra
note 123.
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“[f]ederalism secures the freedom of the individual” as well as the prerogatives
129
of state governments. The link between judicial enforcement of federalism
and individual liberty is now a sufficiently mainstream idea that even liberal
Supreme Court justices are willing to sign on to it, albeit only to a limited
degree.
The link between federalism and liberty was also a recurring theme in the
opinions of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a key swing-vote Justice on the
Rehnquist Court. In the important 1992 case of New York v. United States, her
majority opinion clearly emphasized that “[s]tate officials cannot consent to the
enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the
Constitution” in part because constitutional federalism exists for the benefit of
130
“the people,” not the states alone. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, she wrote that “[i]n
131
the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.” The
Court drew these ideas from the classical-liberal thought of the Founding
132
Fathers more than from modern libertarianism. But obviously the latter has
its intellectual origins in the former, and both are at odds with the New Deal
view that limitations on federal power have little—if any—value in protecting
individual freedom.
Less recognized than the above two connections between libertarian
constitutional thought on federalism and the Court’s jurisprudence is the
latter’s endorsement of the idea that state consent does not justify the
expansion of federal power into otherwise unconstitutional realms. This precept
is a logical extension of the related precept that constitutional limits on federal
power are supposed to benefit the people, not just state governments.
A majority of the Court endorsed the theory as early as 1992, in New York
v. United States, where Justice O’Connor ruled that state consent was not
enough to justify otherwise impermissible federal “commandeering” of state
governments. O’Connor wrote for the majority that “powerful incentives might
lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal
133
structure to be in their personal interests.” If limits on federal power are
meant to protect individual liberty, not just the interests of state governments, it
follows that judicial enforcement may often be needed, because the states
cannot be trusted to defend federalism in the political process in cases where it
does not serve their own purposes, but does protect individual freedom. This
point is a central precept of modern libertarian theories of federalism
134
jurisprudence. More generally, if the states often have an interest in
expanding federal power beyond its constitutional bounds, then their political

129. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
130. New York. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182–83 (1992).
131. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
132. See, e.g., id. at 457–59 (discussing the Founders’ thinking on this point).
133. 505 U.S. at 182.
134. See, e.g., Greve, supra note 122; John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights:
A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 125 (2004).
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power cannot be a justification for judicial deference to Congress.
Overall, there is a large gap between the Court’s current federalism
jurisprudence and where most libertarians would want it to be. So far, the
revival of federalism under the Rehnquist and Roberts courts has had only very
modest results. However, a majority of the Court has embraced three key
precepts of libertarian constitutional thought: (1) that the judiciary must
enforce structural limits on federal power, (2) that such limits promote
individual liberty as well as the interests of state governments, and (3) that state
consent cannot alone justify expansions of federal power because state
governments often have interests that diverge from those of the general public.
B. The Libertarian View of Federalism and the Progressive View of
Separation of Powers
Although the libertarian approach to constitutional federalism has arguably
converged with that of the Supreme Court majority in some important respects,
the same cannot be said with respect to most left-liberal academics’ and jurists’
views of federalism. With rare exceptions, progressive scholars and judges have
rejected nearly all recent efforts to promote judicial enforcement of structural
135
limits on congressional power. It may be a long time, if ever, before there is
any substantial convergence between left-liberal and libertarian constitutional
thought on this issue.
There is, however, an important congruence between the way libertarians
view federalism issues and the way progressives approach other structural
questions in constitutional law. Although most of the latter are hostile to
judicial enforcement of federalism, many of them support aggressive
enforcement of separation of powers constraints on executive power.
The liberal justices on the Supreme Court and most left-of-center academics
supported the Court’s decisions to limit executive power to detain and
136
interrogate suspected terrorists during the war on terror. In the most recent of
137
these cases, Boumediene v. Bush, in 2008, the Court restricted the President’s
exercise of detention authority even though he had congressional authorization.
Modern liberal constitutional theorists have defended these decisions and
have urged tighter judicial constraints on the exercise of executive power
because they recognize that the political process–including Congress–is often
unable or unwilling to curb presidential power grabs, especially in a time of
138
crisis. Bruce Ackerman has even argued for the creation of a new specialized
135. For example, the liberal justices on the court consistently voted against limitations on federal
power in cases such as Lopez, Morrison, and Printz. It is notable, however, that Justices Stephen
Breyer and Elena Kagan voted to invalidate part of the expansion of Medicaid grants to state
governments in NFIB v. Sebelius.
136. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525, 536
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
137. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 729–30 (2008).
138. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(2010); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING
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court intended to rein in executive power, for fear that the Supreme Court, as
139
presently constituted, is unlikely to be forceful enough.
These liberal scholars and jurists offer a critique of unconstrained executive
power similar to the libertarian critique of unconstrained congressional power.
Both groups argue that the political process cannot be trusted to constrain
140
abuses on its own because of perverse incentives. Accordingly, both are also
willing to support judicial intervention even though the political branches of
government may have superior information and expertise. The disparity
between the judiciary’s and the political branches’ knowledge may actually be
greater in the realm of wartime issues than domestic policymaking, because the
former often involves complex classified intelligence data that cannot be
publicized. Furthermore, both libertarians and liberals argue that judicial
enforcement of structural constraints on government power is essential to
preserve not only the institutional prerogatives of different branches and levels
141
of government, but individual liberty.
If presidents can abuse an
unconstrained power to detain and surveil, so too can Congress abuse an
unconstrained power to regulate and mandate.
Finally, both the modern liberal approach to executive power and the
modern conservative approach to federalism represent important breaks with
New Deal–era orthodoxy. New Deal jurists and constitutional theorists were,
for the most part, comfortable with a high degree of judicial deference to the
142
executive, especially in wartime. For example, a Supreme Court dominated by
Roosevelt-appointed New Dealers held, in one of the Japanese internment
cases, that “[s]ince the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress
the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it
has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and
discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or
danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it . . . Where, as they did
here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the
choice of means by those branches of the Government on which the
Constitution has placed the responsibility of warmaking, it is not for any court
to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute it judgment for
143
theirs.” Few liberal jurists or constitutional scholars would endorse these
words today.
With a few exceptions, libertarian constitutional theorists have recognized
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2006); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); HAROLD
KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR (1990).
139. ACKERMAN, supra note 138, at ch. 6.
140. See, e.g., id.; ELY, supra note 138.
141. See ACKERMAN, supra note 138; COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 138.
142. For the classic account, see generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
(1973).
143. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943).
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the important parallels between abuses of executive power and unconstitutional
congressional overreach. For example, Randy Barnett has taken a leading role
in challenging expansive National Security Agency surveillance that is
144
purportedly justified by the exigencies of the war on terror.
This is not to suggest that it is impossible to draw meaningful distinctions
between executive and congressional overreach. Obviously, many liberals
believe there are differences that justify greater judicial intervention in the
former area, whereas many conservatives believe the opposite. Our point is not
that such distinctions are inherently invalid, but that there are also strong
parallels between the two areas. These parallels could potentially lead to a
measure of convergence between liberal and libertarian views on structural
constitutional law.
For the moment, such convergence seems unlikely. But it is worth noting
that, over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court majority has expanded both
its efforts to enforce federalism constraints on Congress and its oversight of the
use of wartime executive power. In both cases, some critics argue that it has not
gone nearly far enough, while others contend that even the modest steps taken
so far are excessive. The arguments offered for and against both of these moves
are strikingly similar. That may be part of the reason why key swing-voter
Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy consistently voted with
the majority in both cases limiting federal power and cases limiting wartime
executive power. That similarity may, over time, be more widely appreciated.
VI
PROPERTY RIGHTS
In few areas is the difference between libertarian and liberal views of
constitutional law more readily apparent than in the field of property rights. For
many decades beginning in the late 1930s, property rights were the “poor
145
relation” of constitutional law, as the Supreme Court famously put it in 1994.
That the judiciary should abjure protection of property rights was one of the
central tenets of New Deal liberal jurisprudence, and a major focus of
146
Progressive criticisms of the old, pre–New Deal era Court.
The post–New Deal conventional wisdom on property rights was epitomized
147
by the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which interpreted
the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that property can only be condemned for a
“public use” nearly out of existence, holding that once the “legislature has
144. See Randy Barnett, The NSA’s Surveillance is Unconstitutional, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July
11, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323823004578593591276402574.
145. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
146. See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT HALE
AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (2001); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY chs. 2, 5
(1992); James W. Ely, Jr., The Progressive Era Assault on Individualism and Property Rights, 29 SOC.
PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY 255, 255 (2012).
147. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”
During this era, the Court also took a very narrow view of what kinds of
government regulations qualify as takings requiring compensation under the
149
Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause.
Since the mid-1980s, however, the Court has begun to revive judicial
protection of property rights under the Fifth Amendment in a variety of ways.
In a series of decisions, it has increased the range of government actions that
150
qualify as takings. Most recently, in a controversial ruling in Koontz v. St.
151
Johns River Water Management District, it significantly broadened the
152
application of takings analysis to land-use permit schemes.
These decisions have not gone nearly as far as libertarian advocates of
153
property rights would like. In many ways, the Court continues to treat
154
property rights less favorably than other enumerated constitutional rights. But
recent decisions do represent a significant change from the immediate post–
New Deal era, and a challenge to the Progressive and New Deal orthodoxy.
At least for the moment, the Court continues to endorse a very broad
conception of what qualifies as a public use. In the highly controversial 2005
155
case of Kelo v. City of New London, the Court ruled that “economic
development” by a private firm is enough to legitimate a taking and reaffirmed
the idea that virtually any public benefit qualifies as a public use—the
government need not even prove that the supposed benefit will actually be
156
achieved. But it is significant that Kelo was a close 5-4 decision, with key
swing-vote Justice Sandra Day O’Connor authoring a forceful dissent, joined by
three other justices, arguing that the Public Use Clause authorizes strong
judicial review and that private economic development is not a permissible
148. Id. at 32.
149. The leading case on this issue was Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
For an overview of this era in Supreme Court property rights jurisprudence, see ELY, supra note 68, at
125–53.
150. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626, 630 (2001) (restrictions imposed before
the current owner purchased property can sometimes be takings); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
392 (1994) (land-use permit restrictions that impose physical invasions without “rough proportionality”
to a government interest); Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (regulations
destroying one-hundred percent of the value of property); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987) (land-use permit restrictions that impose physical invasions without an “essential nexus” to a
government interest).
151. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
152. For an analysis and defense of Koontz, see Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor
Relation” of Constitutional Law: Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause,
2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 215.
153. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN
(1987).
154. For an analysis of several such double standards, see Ilya Somin, Taking Property Rights
Seriously? The Supreme Court and the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law, George Mason Law &
Econ. Research Paper No. 08-53 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1247854.
155. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
156. Id. at 476–83.
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public use. In a solo dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas outlined an even more
extensive challenge to the post–New Deal Court’s ultradeferential public use
158
jurisprudence. Justice Anthony Kennedy, the swing voter in the case,
authored a concurring opinion that suggested that heightened scrutiny of
condemnations that transfer property to private parties might be appropriate in
some cases where there was sufficient evidence of “favoritism” towards private
159
interests. Even the majority opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens was
160
slightly less deferential to the government than previous precedent had been.
If nothing else, the close result in Kelo shattered the previous consensus
among experts, who viewed the broad post–New Deal view of public use as
nearly unchallengeable orthodoxy that was both clearly correct and firmly
161
established. If any Justices epitomize the constitutional mainstream of the late
twentieth and early twenty-first century, it is perennial Supreme Court swingvoters O’Connor and Kennedy. The fact that that one of them decisively
repudiated the equation of public use and potential public benefit, while the
other at least raised questions about its validity, is a powerful sign of the erosion
of the New Deal consensus on constitutional property rights issues. In the
aftermath of Kelo, that consensus was further weakened by the refusal of
several state supreme courts to adopt Kelo as a guide to the public use clauses
of their state constitutions, and. by extensive disagreement among state and
lower federal courts over the question of what qualifies as a “pretextual” taking.
Under Kelo, pretextual takings are considered violations of the Public Use
Clause because the official rationale for the condemnation in such cases is a
mere pretext “for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular
162
private party.”
Outside the judiciary, Kelo led to a nearly unprecedented political backlash,
with public opinion polls showing some eighty percent of Americans opposed to
the decision, and some forty-five states enacting eminent domain–reform laws
in response to the ruling—a more extensive legislative reaction than that which
163
resulted from any other Supreme Court decision.
The political reaction to Kelo indicates the potential for a degree of
convergence between libertarians and liberals on constitutional property rights
issues. While most property rights cases divide observers along ideological lines,
157. Id. at 493–506 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 507–26 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160. For a detailed discussion of this point, see ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY
OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 4 (forthcoming 2015).
161. See id. at ch. 2 (providing citations to various experts who made such claims before Kelo); id.
at ch. 4, Conclusion (explaining how the consensus was undermined by Kelo).
162. 545 U.S. at 477–78. For detailed overviews of the relevant lower court jurisprudence on these
issues, see id. at ch. 7; Ilya Somin, The Judicial Reaction to Kelo, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 24 (2011)
(symposium on eminent domain) (documenting skeptical reaction by several state supreme courts).
163. For a detailed analysis of the survey data and legislative reaction, see SOMIN, supra note 160, at
chs. 5–6. See also Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2109–13 (2009).
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with libertarians and conservatives supporting property rights and liberals
tending to support the government, numerous liberal commentators, activists,
and organizations were among those condemning Kelo and filing amicus briefs
urging the Court to strike down economic development takings. They included
the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (a prominent
mostly African-American civil rights group), and left-wing activist Ralph
164
Nader. One of the present authors, a libertarian law professor, filed an amicus
brief on behalf of legendary left-of-center urban development theorist Jane
165
Jacobs.
Opposition to Kelo from the left was driven by, among other things, a
recognition that economic development and “blight condemnations” often
target the poor, the politically weak, and racial minorities for the purpose of
transferring their property to politically connected developers and other
166
influential interest groups. Other property rights issues do not necessarily
have the same valence. But their distributional consequences are nonetheless
often more complex than the traditional New Deal worldview might suggest.
Often, they involve government regulations that benefit well-connected interest
groups at the expense of the general public, even if they do not necessarily
involve straightforward “reverse Robin Hood” transfers from the poor to the
167
affluent.
It is unlikely that libertarian and liberal views on constitutional property
rights will ever completely converge, or even that they will become as close as
the two groups’ views on “noneconomic” rights. Libertarians support strong
protection for property rights even in cases where government restrictions on
them do not inflict harm on the poor and disadvantaged, while liberals are
unlikely to go that far. But the interesting anti-Kelo coalition suggests the
possibility that the differences between the two might narrow.
So far, liberal opposition to Kelo has not, for the most part, affected
attitudes among left-of-center federal judges and prominent legal scholars, most
of whom tend to support the result in Kelo and continue to endorse the
extremely broad view of public use outlined in the Court’s pre-Kelo
jurisprudence. But that may eventually change over time. The next generation
of progressive federal judges and legal scholars might include a higher
proportion whose views on public use resemble those of Jacobs, Nader, and the
NAACP.
Finally, convergence between liberal and libertarian views of constitutional
property rights might occur because the extremely deferential New Deal
approach to property rights is at odds with the dominant liberal view of most

164. See SOMIN, supra note 160, at chs. 1, 5.
165. Brief for Jane Jacobs as Amica Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108).
166. See SOMIN supra note 160, at ch. 1.
167. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Why Robbing Peter Won’t Help Poor Paul: Low-Income Neighborhoods
and Uncompensated Regulatory Takings, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 72 (2007).
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other constitutional rights. In contrast to many early twentieth-century
168
Progressives, modern liberals generally support strong judicial enforcement of
a wide range of individual rights, including freedom of speech, privacy rights,
rights against racial and gender discrimination, and the rights of criminal
defendants. In this context, extensive deference on property rights issues seems
an unusual anomaly. As James Ely points out with respect to the Public Use
Clause, “among all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, only the public use
169
limitation is singled out for heavy [judicial] deference.”
If liberal scholars and jurists were to treat property rights protected by the
Takings Clause the same way as they treat other constitutional rights, they
would still not necessarily grant these rights as much protection as libertarians
claim they should. After all, liberals, like conservatives, often prefer to give
government greater scope relative to individual liberty in a wide range of areas
where libertarians would prefer tighter constraints. But it would significantly
diminish the gap between the two camps.
Obviously, such convergence is by no means inevitable. As memories of
Kelo fade, liberals could potentially reunite in defense of New Deal–era
orthodoxy. Alternatively, libertarian constitutionalism could gradually fade as a
significant, distinct movement in constitutional thought and return to the fringe
obscurity it was consigned to in the decades immediately following the Great
Depression. It is also possible that the two sides’ views of property rights will
remain as deeply divided as they are today.
Be that as it may, it is clear that the Supreme Court, over the last several
decades, has gradually brought some key libertarian ideas on property rights
back into the mainstream, and there is some potential for convergence between
libertarian and liberal approaches to these issues. That potential is highlighted
by the reactions of many in both groups to the Kelo case and by the anomalous
status of property rights in modern liberal constitutional thought.
While libertarian theories of constitutional property rights have gained
ground in recent years, it is only fair to note that libertarian efforts to
strengthen judicial protection for economic liberties such as freedom of contract
170
have attracted far less support. Lochner v. New York, the 1905 case that
symbolizes judicial protection for such rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, continues to be one of the most reviled Supreme Court decisions
of all time, in the eyes of mainstream jurists and liberal academics. The modern
Court has so far not chosen to revisit the ultra-deferential approach to
168. See supra Part II.
169. James W. Ely, Jr., ‘Poor Relation’ Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights of
Property Owners, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 62. It might be thought that the Second Amendment
right to bear arms was another such anomaly. But at the time Ely wrote, most liberals, as well as the
Supreme Court, had not yet endorsed the idea that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
at all, as opposed to a “collective” right of state militias. The Court did not interpret the Second
Amendment as protecting an individual right until 2008. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 581 (2008).
170. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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restrictions on economic freedom adopted in Williamson v. Lee Optical.
Libertarian scholars who seek to challenge the dominant view on judicial
172
protection for economic liberties have achieved only very limited success.
Still, several lower court decisions have recently struck down particularly
egregious licensing restrictions as violating the Fourteenth Amendment, a
development which suggests that the deferential “rational basis” test that
173
currently applies to economic regulations may over time develop “bite.” In
addition, libertarian defenses of judicial protection for economic liberty are now
taken seriously in academic and jurisprudential circles to a much greater extent
than was the case twenty or thirty years ago. It is possible that libertarian legal
thought in this area may follow the same gradual path towards mainstream
influence as it already has in the field of property rights.
VII
CONCLUSION
Libertarian constitutionalism is likely to remain a small minority movement
among jurists and legal scholars for the foreseeable future. But libertarian ideas
nonetheless have had significant influence on modern Supreme Court
jurisprudence. With respect to noneconomic liberties and equal protection of
the law, modern jurisprudence has adopted, albeit in modified form, a
surprising number of doctrines that originated in the supposedly benighted pre–
New Deal period. With regard to federalism and property rights, there is a
much larger gap between libertarian ideas and dominant precedent, and an
even bigger one between libertarian views and those of left-liberal
constitutional theorists. Nonetheless, libertarian ideas have made some progress
within the Court in recent years. And, as the Kelo case dramatically
demonstrated, there are also important commonalities between libertarian and
liberal legal thought in these fields—commonalities that create some potential
for convergence.

171. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
172. For examples of such works, see DAVID N.
MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT:
REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2011); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO
EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW (2010); BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980). One of the present authors has argued extensively that
Lochner v. New York does not deserve most of the opprobrium heaped upon it by Progressives and
their intellectual heirs. See generally BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 3.
173. For an overview and discussion of these decisions, see Douglas Ginsburg & Steven Menashi,
Rational Basis with Economic Bite, 8 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 1055 (2014).

